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THE GRAND IRONY OF ERISA?:
INTERSECTIONALITY OF ERISA
PREEMPTION AND REMEDIAL ISSUES
SYMPOSIUM
THE PATERNALISTIC IDEOLOGY OF ERISA
AND UNFORGIVING COURTS:
RESTORING BALANCE THROUGH
A GRAND BARGAIN
Edward A. Zelinsky*
I am flattered to be making these remarks to a gathering that
includes so many leading experts on ERISA, retirement, and employee
benefits issues. There are those that suggest that this type of face-to-face
symposium is obsolete-that modem technology eliminates the need for
individuals to come together in one place, at one time to discuss matters
of mutual concern.
The editors of the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal have
wisely ignored this advice.
Despite the enormous benefits of
contemporary telecommunications, there is still a need to convene
periodically like our grandparents did. There is, in the final analysis, a
limit to the quality of a human relationship which can be established by
e-mail.
It is, moreover, particularly appropriate that this group convenes
now. Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
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19741 ("ERISA") while I was in law school. In the subsequent thirtyfive years, the statute and its import have grown enormously.2 As the
leading edge of the Baby Boomers moves into retirement mode,
challenges which were real but remote in 1974 are today urgent and
apparent. Even before the Crash of 2008, 3 there was understandable
concern about the level of retirement savings or, to be more accurate, the
lack of such savings by many.4
Moreover, we are now posed for a national debate on health care.5
For most working Americans, ERISA-regulated, employer-provided
health care is their principal means of obtaining medical services. 6

1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.,
29 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 1-2 (2004) (noting that although ERISA was originally intended to
reform pension law, it has come to have profound impacts on "health, life, and disability insurance"
as well as other "non-related fields of law[, such as] finance.
securities, banking, marriage and
divorce, [and] real property, to name a few").
3. See Kirk Shinkle, The Crash of 2008: How Bad Is It, and When Will It End?, U.S. NEWS
&
WORLD
REPORT,
Oct.
17,
2008,
available
at
http://www.usnews.com/articles/business/investing/2008/10/17/the-crash-of-2008.htmi (stating that
the 2,400 point drop in the Dow Jones industrial average in late September 2008 was comparable to
Black Monday in 1987 or the 1929 crash before the Great Depression); Mary Williams Walsh, After
Losses, PensionsAsk for a Change, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at BI (stating that since the crash,
the "total value of company pension funds is thought to have fallen by more than $250 billion").
4.

See, e.g., TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I'M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST PENSIONS

AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 261-62 (2008) (stating that for the last three decades "overall
pension coverage has stayed flat rather than expanding, leaving half of all workers with no
workplace retirement plan"); Steven Hipple, Contingent Work in the Late-1990s, 124 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 3, 21 tbl. 13, 23 (2001) (finding a low proportion of contingent workers have pension
coverage).
5. Compare United States National Health Care Act, H.R. 676, 111 th Cong. (lst Sess. 2009)
(submitting a publicly financed, privately delivered health care system that will provide all
Americans access to health-care, regardless of income), and President's Address Before a Joint
Session of the Congress, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 200900105, at 5-6 (Feb. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ presdocs/2009/DCPD200900105.pdf ("[W]e can no longer afford to put
health care reform on hold ....
Now, there will be many different opinions and ideas about how to
achieve that reform ....
[But] let there be no doubt: Health care reform cannot wait."), with
REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., 2008 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 37 (2008), available at
http://platform.gop.com/2008Platform.pdf ("Republicans support the private practice of medicine
and oppose socialized medicine in the form of government-run universal health care system."), and
Jim Rutenberg, Health Critic Brings a Past and a Wallet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at Al
(discussing the campaign of President Obama's "most visible conservative opponent," Richard
Scott, whose "sole policy interest is to see to it that ... [President] Obama and Congress ... [do]
not move the country toward a socialized system").
6. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Health Plans & Benefits, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/healthplans/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) ("Most private sector health plans are covered by ...
ERISA."); see also Lorraine Schmall & Brenda Stephens, ERISA Preemption: A Move Towards
Defederalizing Claims for Patients' Rights, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 529, 538-39 (2004). But see

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol26/iss2/4

2

Zelinsky: The Paternalistic Ideology of ERISA and Unforgiving Courts: Resto

2009]

RESTORING BALANCE THROUGHA GRAND BARGAIN

As is true for most of us at this Symposium, ERISA, employee
benefits and retirement issues have played a central role in my
professional life. I wish I could tell you that this resulted from a plan
carefully conceived while I was young and consistently executed with
foresight and skill. The truth, I am afraid, is distinctly less flattering.
I was one of many research assistants for Professor Boris Bittker
while he was writing his magisterial treatise on the federal tax law.7
This was during the Nixon Administration when the release of the White
House tapes made "expletive deleted" part of our national lexicon.8 At
one point, Professor Bittker indicated to me that he was interested in
reports that Congress was considering comprehensive legislation
concerning qualified retirement plans. He asked me to explore this.
Today, of course, one can push some buttons and easily retrieve
proposals and other relevant materials. For the benefit of those who
were not there, the world of legal research was once quite different and,
I dare say, more challenging. After days of effort, I had a modest grasp
of the possible scope of federal legislation. Accordingly, Professor
Bittker took me out for a cup of coffee so I could brief him on my
research.
Within seconds of starting, I realized that this briefing was not
going as I had planned. Wordlessly but effectively, Professor Bittker
communicated to me his disbelief that Congress would do anything
along the lines I was describing. Finally, after ten minutes, Professor
Bittker sagely looked at me and declared, "Ed, they won't do anything
this crazy."
Shortly thereafter, President Ford signed ERISA into law.
I finished law school and completed my clerkship without giving
another thought to ERISA. Then, on my first day as a junior associate, I
walked into the office of the partner to whom I had been assigned. He
seemed very old to me though he was fifteen years younger than I am
today. He held in his hands the CCH copy of ERISA, which he
unceremoniously threw at me. Declared this elderly partner, "I'm too

Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2006)
(exempting from coverage health plans established and maintained by government or church
entities; plans maintained outside the United States primarily for nonresident aliens; plans
maintained solely to comply with workers' compensation, unemployment compensation or
disability law; and unfunded deferred compensation plans for a select group of top management or
highly qualified executives).
7. BORIS 1. BIVFIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS (2d ed. 1989).
8. See 3 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: RUIN AND RECOVERY, 1973-1990, at 328-29 (1991).
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old to learn this"--here I delete an expletive. "Besides," he continued,
"Bittker told us you are his ERISA expert."
Thus, my ERISA career was launched.
Several years later, as a newly-minted assistant professor, the senior
tax faculty members at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law asked me
what courses I wanted to teach. When I said that I wanted to teach about
ERISA, I elicited incredulous stares. Why did I possibly want to teach
such a course?
I wish I could recount for you an eloquent response about the
growing importance of retirement savings to our national capital
markets, 9 the looming challenge of financing the Baby Boomers' golden
years, 0 or the incipient concern about rising health care costs."l Instead,
I mumbled the less elegant truth that ERISA was the only thing I knew
much about. This barely satisfied my inquisitors who volunteered that it
was all right for me to teach one oddball course as long as I carried my
weight as to the real curriculum.
When I taught an ERISA course in those early years, I was the bane
of the Cardozo secretarial pool. In those benighted days, we did not
have the fine ERISA textbooks available to us today. 12 Lexis, Westlaw,
and other electronic databases were in their infancies. The legal
literature addressing ERISA issues was sparse.
As a result, we cut, pasted, and photocopied thousands of pages of
cases and articles which my students unhappily lugged to class and the
secretaries even more unhappily prepared for them to lug to class.
I now have thirty years' inventory of these kinds of ERISA
anecdotes. I also have a reasonably captive audience for the duration of
this presentation and four children who invariably excuse themselves
from the family dinner table when they hear the dreaded term "ERISA."
My offspring are particularly unappreciative of my observation, as they
flee the supper-time telling of my anecdotes, that ERISA over the years

9. See Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, The Intertemporal Approach to the Current
Account, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INT'L ECON. 1731 (G. Grossman & K. Rogoff, eds., 1995).
10. See, e.g., LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF & SCOTT BURNS, THE COMING GENERATIONAL
STORM 66-67, 141 (2004) (arguing that the Baby Boomers' retirement will wreak havoc on society
because there is not enough money to finance them).
11. See HEALTHREFORM.GOV, THE COSTS OF INACTION: THE URGENT NEED FOR HEALTH
REFORM 1, http://www.healthreform.gov/reports/inaction/inactionreportprintmarch2009.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2009).
12. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND
WELFARE BENEFITS (2d ed. 2008); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW (4th ed. 2006); COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2007).
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has helped to pay their not inconsiderable tuition bills.
I shall nevertheless resist the temptation to invade further my
inventory of ERISA stories as the editors of the Hofstra Labor &
Employment Law Journal quite rightly expect something more
substantive. So let me attempt to distill the lessons ERISA has taught
me over the years: ERISA and its thirty-five year legislative and
administrative evolution reflect a very precise ideology, what might be
called the ideology of ERISA, a paternalistic ideology of good
intentions.1 3 Simultaneously, the courts have often approached ERISA14
issues from a totally different vantage, in an unforgiving fashion.
These disparate approaches have led to a pronounced imbalance between
ERISA as a statutory and administrative phenomenon, and ERISA as a
judicial phenomenon. Ideally, a grand bargain could restore balance to
the benefit of all concerned, employers and employees alike.
In many respects, it seems naive for a law professor, and for me in
particular, to argue that the adoption and subsequent evolution of ERISA
is in large measure a story of good intentions gone awry. Even before
the rise of modern public choice theory, the most acute observers of
democratic government have understood the influence of special
When Edmund Burke
interests upon legislative deliberations. 15
famously observed that the members of Parliament owe their
constituents not merely the members' energies, but also the members'
independent judgments, 16 he was advancing a normative claim in a
legislative environment notoriously dominated by what we today call

13. See WOOTEN, supra note 2, at 271-72 (explaining that ERISA has evolved under a
"worker-security theory"); Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 111, 112-13 & n.10 (1993).

14. See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144, 148 (1985) (holding that
plaintiff was not entitled to compensatory and punitive damages for the pension administrator's
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA sections 409 and 502(a)); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508
U.S. 248, 255-58 (1993) (holding that money damages are not "appropriate equitable relief' under
ERISA section 502(a)(3)); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 218
(2002) (holding that a pension plan could not seek reimbursement for medical payments for plan
participants because such reimbursement would not constitute equitable restitution).
15.

See, e.g., ISSAC KRAMNICK, BOLINGBROKE AND His CIRCLE 50, 70-75 (1968) (describing

Lord Bolingbroke's polemics against British Prime Minister Robert Walpole since the late 1680s,
who Bolingbroke claimed was controlled by "stockjobbers," financiers, and monopolistic
corporations).
16. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in I THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 391, 392 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl3s7.html. ("Your representative owes you, not his
industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your
opinion.").
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described

democratic government in a large republic as the clash of "factions"
assembled into inherently unstable majorities.18 Modem public choice
theory 19 translates and elaborates these venerable observations into a
contemporary idiom capturing the same truth: Democratically elected
legislatures respond to well-organized interest groups.20
In a variety of contexts, I have found this insight helpful to explain

important phenomena such as the persistence of unfunded mandates. 2'
Moreover, the impact of particular interests upon ERISA's initial
adoption and subsequent evolution is undeniable.22 The story of ERISA

cannot be told coherently without acknowledging the influence of
employer groups, organized labor, the insurance industry, and other
important constituencies.23
But if that influence cannot be denied, neither should it be
overstated. An explanation of ERISA which focuses only on those
groups and their respective agendas misses an essential part of the story.
ERISA, both in its original form and in its subsequent elaborations,
reflects an influential ideology. Like most successful ideologies, the
ideology of ERISA is rarely articulated because it is so deeply
embedded. The first premise of this ideology is that the Internal
Revenue Code's treatment of qualified plans is a tax expenditure.24
From this premise is drawn the corollary that the federal government

17. See STEPHEN MILLER, SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS INAMERICAN POLITICS 1-2 (1983).
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
19. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 284-88
(1962); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1355, 136980 (1993) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates]; Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and
Public Choice at Gucci Gluch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102
YALE L.J. 1165, 1171-73 (1993).
20. See Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, supra note 19, at 1380-86.
21. Id.; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem of the Unfunded Mandate, 23 OHIO N.U.
L. REv. 741, 744-45 (1997).
22. See Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative Process
and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 47, 50-51, 58-59 (1988) (explaining the influence of
organized labor, business groups, and the insurance industry in the provisions of ERISA).
23. See generally WOOTEN, supra note 2 (discussing the influence of special interest groups
on the political history of pension reform).
24. Norman P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage: Problems with
the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform the Social Security Debate, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1369, 1373-74 (2001). 1 dissent from the prevailing consensus that the current tax
treatment of qualified plans is properly characterized as a tax expenditure. EDWARD A. ZELINSKY,
THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM
CHANGED AMERICA 38 n.23, 150-51 (2007).
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properly conditions and channels this tax expenditure by regulating in
great detail the terms and operations of qualified retirement plans.
More regulation is always better because it is, in large measure, the
Treasury's money being regulated.26
The second premise of the ideology of ERISA is that most
individuals, and certainly most rank-and-file employees, are incapable
on their own of making good decisions about retirement savings and
about other fringe benefits. 27
Because such overtly-articulated
paternalism is so disfavored in American political discourse, this
premise, though widely-shared among ERISA mavens, is rarely
acknowledged. But this usually unarticulated premise also underpins the
belief that more regulation is invariably better.2 8
This regulation-inducing ideology has fueled more and more
statutory and administrative complexity.
Congress' successive
amendments to ERISA, most recently the Pension Protection Act of
200629 ("2006 Act"), have turned what was originally a complicated
statute into a document emulating the Talmud's intricacy while lacking
the Talmud's wisdom. 30 The Treasury and the Department of Labor
("DOL") regulations enforcing ERISA's statutory maze implement a
difficult law by compounding the difficulties.3 1
However, much of this statutory and regulatory complexity has
been well-intentioned, designed and administered by persons who,

25. See Stein & Dilley, supra note 24, at 1374.
26. Cf Yun Zhang, The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and
Private Pension System Reform, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 629, 640, 649-50 (2003) (discussing the
enactment of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, which "sacrificed
almost fifty billion dollars of tax revenues on private pension plans and individual retirement
arrangement," but also added "over forty provisions affecting pension plans and benefits").
27. See ZELINSKY, supra note 24, at 7-10.
28. Cf Alexander, supra note 13, at 118 (stating that ERISA's "twin policies of passivity and
paternalism seemingly require that employees not bear the investment risk").
29. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.).
30. Compare Tax Planning:Pension ProtectionAct of 2006, NEWSLETTER (Fitzsimmons Fin.
Group,
LLC,
Pittsburg,
Pa.),
Oct.
2006,
at
2,
http://fitzsimmonsfinancialgroup.com/files/TaxPlanning_ThePensionProtection Act of 2006.p
df (detailing the complexity the Pension Protection Act of 2006 adds to ERISA), with Rabbi Elliot
Rose Kukla, The Twisted Wick: Talmud Study as Spiritual Practicefor Post-Modern Jews, ZEEK,
July 2007, http://www.zeek.net/707talmud/ (explaining the complexity of the Talmud, but at the
same time illustrating its wisdom).
31. See Sylvester J. Schieber, The Evolution and Implications of Federal Pension
Regulations, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM 11, 24-25 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2005); see
also J. Reed Cline, Administrative Aspects of Enhanced Fee Disclosure in 401(k) Plans, 16 J.
PENSION BENEFITS: ISSUES IN ADMIN. 62, 62-63 (2008).
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consistent with the paternalistic ideology of ERISA, believe that they are
channeling government revenues to encourage retirement savings for
rank-and-file employees who cannot discern their own long-term
interests or, if they understand those interests, cannot advance them
without a heavy dollop of federal protection. 32
Routinely we hear from those drafting, enacting, and administering
these statutes and regulations that they appreciate that, under our
voluntary system of employer-sponsored plans, excessive regulation and
complexity can deter employers, particularly small employers, from
sponsoring qualified plans and other fringe benefit arrangements.33
However, this admonition is the employee benefit plan equivalent of
"I'll respect you in the morning": The speaker really does not believe it
and the listener is naive in thinking that the speaker does. In short,
ERISA as it exists today is, in significant part, the product of a
paternalistic ideology which ignores the costs of regulation since such
regulation channels putative tax benefits and since the motivation for
such regulation is benign.
The results have been more elaborate statutes and more detailed
regulations and administrative programs, much of which, while wellintentioned, is counterproductive of the goal of extending and protecting
employees' interests in their retirement incomes and other employee
benefits.34 At the end of the day, complexity and compliance costs deter
employers-particularly small and medium-sized employers-from
establishing and maintaining ERISA-regulated retirement and employee
benefit plans.35 Ideas often matter, particularly when they are wrong.
But life is never simple. If the employee-protective ideology of
ERISA holds sway in the legislative and administrative agencies which
supervise and manage the federal government's regulation of retirement
income and employee benefits plans, that ideology does not prevail in
one important venue: the courts.36 This brings us to the subjects of
today's Symposium: ERISA's preemptive effect and ERISA's remedial

32. See Pension Plan Complexity: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Private Retirement Plans
and Oversight of the Internal Revenue Serv. of the S. Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong. 127 (1990)
(statement of Sen. David Pryor, Member, S.Comm. on Finance).
33. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good
Loophole Deserves Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHiCS 89, 130-32 (2005).
34. See Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionalityand the Grand Irony of ERISA,
61 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2009).
35. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 130-32.
36. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144, 148 (1985); Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-58 (1993); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 205, 221 (2004);
DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003).
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provisions.
While the paternalistic or, if you prefer, protective doctrine of
ERISA underpins legislative and administrative decision making as to
employee benefits plans, that has not been true in the courts.37 In the
courts, a more unforgiving approach to ERISA and employee benefits
has prevailed.3 8 Thus, the courts have understood the preemptive effect
of ERISA section 51439 broadly, foreclosing the states from
experimenting in ways intended to protect employees and their
families.4 ° Similarly, the judiciary has construed ERISA section 50241
narrowly, indeed in a fashion which most observers find byzantine and
unfair, denying remedies to injured individuals in circumstances which
are troubling.42
The disadvantages of the courts' current, overly-restrictive concept
of ERISA preemption manifest themselves most acutely today as states
and localities seek to experiment in the health care arena but find
themselves hampered by ERISA preemption. Maryland's "Wal-Mart"
Act has been declared ERISA-preempted by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.43 Important parts of Massachusetts' new health
law are similarly vulnerable to ERISA preemption challenge."
A
splintered Ninth Circuit has sustained San Francisco's new health care
ordinance against such a challenge 45 but I am skeptical that, under the
Supreme Court's case law, the Ninth Circuit is correct.46
37. See, e.g., DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453; Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180,
197-98 (4th Cir. 2007).
38. See, e.g., Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255-58; DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453; Fielder, 475 F.3d at
197-98.
39. Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(2006).
40. E.g., Fielder,475 F.3d at 191, 193, 197-98.
41. ERISA § 502,29 U.S.C. § 1132.
42. E.g., DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 444, 446, 449, 453.
43. Fielder,475 F.3d at 193, 197-98. See also Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland's "Wal-Mart"
Act: Policy and Preemption, 28 CARDOZO LAW REV. 847 (2006), reprinted in NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Alvin D. Lurie ed.,

2007).
44. Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law. Preemption and
Experimentation,49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 229, 232 (2007).
45. In Golden Gate Restaurant Ass 'n v. City & County of San Francisco,558 F.3d 1000 (9th
Cir. 2009), the active judges of the Ninth Circuit refused to hear en banc an appeal of a panel
decision upholding the San Francisco health care ordinance against an ERISA preemption
challenge. Id. at 1000-01. However, in a persuasive dissent, Circuit Judge Milan Smith was joined
by seven of his colleagues in concluding that ERISA does preempt the San Francisco ordinance. Id.
at 1009-10 (Smith, J., dissenting).
46. Edward A. Zelinsky, Employer Mandates and ERISA Preemption: A Critique of Golden
Gate Restaurant Association v. San Francisco, 50 ST. TAX NOTES 503 (2008); Edward A. Zelinsky,
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As to these state and local health care laws, for present purposes,
the issue is not the design or wisdom of such laws. As a matter of
policy, I have grave reservations about the Maryland and San Francisco
ordinances. If, however, one believes (as I do) that the great strength of
our federal system is that it encourages experimentation and
accommodation of local preferences, these efforts-at least at the state
level 47-- should be allowed to proceed.
Just as the courts discourage state and local health care initiatives
through an expansive notion of ERISA preemption, the courts have
construed ERISA's remedial provisions as foreclosing relief in
compelling contexts.48 Everyone has his own favorite horror story in
this area. The bottom line is that the courts often treat section 502 as an
anti-remedies provision. 49 This results in unfairness in particular cases
and systemic underdeterrence as plans and employers are relieved of the
consequences of bad behavior.
As to this judicial part of the ERISA story, a public choice
explanation is quite revealing since, to maintain the ERISA status quo in
the courts, all the employer community need do is block any legislative
changes to sections 502 and 514. So far, this effort to preserve the status
quo has been successful.
We thus have a remarkably unbalanced situation with Congress, the
Treasury, and the DOL embracing the well-intentioned, paternalistic
ideology of ERISA, generating more and more complex statutes and
regulations without regard to the often counterproductive nature of this
legal output. Simultaneously, the courts, at the other end of spectrum,
stymie experiments in state regulation and often frustrate efforts to
remedy quite real harms.
Can we get to a more balanced and productive approach? The
journal editors who convened this Symposium have focused our
attention upon the "grand irony" of ERISA. In that spirit, let me suggest
"a grand bargain" to retool ERISA for the challenges of the twenty-first
century. This grand bargain would have four major elements.
First, there should be a significant reduction of ERISA's regulation

Employer Mandates and ERISA Preemptionin the Ninth Circuit,47 ST. TAX NOTES 603 (2008).

47. 1 am increasingly sympathetic to the argument that municipal regulation of employee
fringe benefits, health care in particular, could impose an unacceptable burden on national
employers since there are literally thousands of localities. See infra note 58.
48. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 444, 449, 453 (3d Cir. 2003).
49. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004); DiFelice, 346 F.3d at
449; Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 430-32 (5th Cir. 2004); Briscoe v.
Fine, 444 F.3d 478, 498-500 (6th Cir. 2006).
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of employers and their employee benefit plans. To be meaningful, this
reduction must be deep. It must cut away both provisions of the original
statute which, however well-intentioned, are today more trouble than
they are worth, as well as more recent regulation which should never
have been adopted in the first place. Everyone will have his own list of
targets for such a deregulation effort. Allow me to suggest two of mine.
It is time to abolish the summary plan description ("SPD"). 50
Whatever the merits of the SPD thirty-five years ago, it makes no sense
today. All employers can easily put their plan documents online or can
transmit their plan documents as e-mail files. The DOL's auditing
practices have forced employers to bulk up the summary plan document
so that there is no longer anything "summary" about it." Today, the
principal function of the enhanced SPD is to make a particularly solid
thud as employees throw it into the garbage can as they leave work. The
second contemporary function of the SPD is to generate litigation as
creative lawyers invariably find tensions between SPDs and the
underlying plan documents.52
Among more recent snafus is the "qualified default investment
alternative," authorized by the 2006 Act 53 just in time to nudge 401(k)
participants to invest in common stocks and thereby experience the thrill
of the Crash of 2008. As an example of misguided paternalism, it is
hard to do better than this. 4 The passive, allegedly unsophisticated
participant who let his 401(k) account default into money market funds
looks a lot smarter today than the folks prodding him to invest in
common stocks.
In the interests of time, I will let these two examples serve as
proxies for a more thoroughgoing revision of the statutory and
administrative thicket today surrounding ERISA-regulated plans. 55 The
50. Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 1022
(2006).
51. 1 recently reviewed a set of prototype documents from a major supplier of such
documents. The plan document was sixty pages long; the summary plan description was twentythree pages long. It is hard to call a document a "summary" when it has over one third as many
pages as the document it is supposedly summarizing.
52. LANGBEIN, STABILE & WOLK, supra note 12, at 571-73.

53. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 624, 120 Stat. 780, 980 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(5)) (adding to ERISA new section 404(c)(5), which authorized
the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations concerning "default investment arrangements").
Pursuant to her authority, the Secretary issued a regulation pertaining to "qualified default
investment alternatives." 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2008).
54. Posting of Edward A. Zelinsky to OUPblog, http://blog.oup.com/2008/09/401k crash/
(Sept. 23, 2008).
55. My larger list for abolition would include the minimum required distribution rules, I.R.C.
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larger point is that, as a first element of a grand bargain, there is much
statutory and administrative regulation which should be repealed. It is
important that that repeal go deep since the space thereby created will be
offset in part by the other three elements of the bargain.
The second such element would be to update ERISA to add to the
statute provisions which are genuinely needed to confront the conditions
of the twenty-first century. These amendments should be added
sparingly since we do not want to replant the thicket we have just
pruned. There are, however, statutory and regulatory additions which, if
made carefully and subtly, can bolster employees' well-being without
overburdening employers.
Here, my example is disclosure of 401(k) investment fees. There is
substantial evidence that full disclosure of such fees, while not costless,
is worthwhile.5 6 I have grave doubts about simply piling this and other
regulations on top of the existing burdens already placed on employee
benefit plans. On the other hand, as part of a grand bargain, there is a
compelling argument that some of the regulatory space achieved by the
first step of deregulation can be filled productively, if filled carefully.
The third element of the grand bargain, like the second, would
absorb some of the regulatory space created in the first stage.
Specifically, this third step would revise section 502 to expand and
rationalize the remedies available to those harmed by ERISA
violations.5 7 I think that we should authorize consequential, tort-type
damages for appropriate ERISA cases, should repeal the restrictions on
remedies imposed by the courts through antediluvian notions of equity,
and should cap noneconomic damages to some reasonable level.
However, for present purposes, the specifics of a revised section 502 are
less important than the broader proposal that section 502 be amended as
part of a grand bargain which entails offsetting deregulation, rather than
simply piled onto the regulatory status quo.

§§ 401(a)(9)-(1 1), 417 (2000), and the joint-and-survivor annuity rules, Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006). See Posting of Edward A.
Zelinsky to OUPblog, http://blog.oup.com/2009/01/ abolish-the-minimum-required-distributionrules/ (Jan. 12, 2009).
56. See, e.g., ECON. SYS., INC., STUDY OF 401(K) PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES §§ 4.2.2, 5.3.3
(1998), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/401krept.pdf; Posting of Ryan Alfred to
illuminating-the-battle-linesBrightScopeBlog,
http://www.brightscope.corn/blog/2009/01/26/
around-401k-fee-disclosure/ (Jan. 26, 2009, 12:15 p.m.); Press Release, H. Comm. on Educ. &
Labor, Chairman Miller Introduces Legislation to Require Full Disclosure of 401(k) Fees &
of
Interest
(July
26,
2007),
available
at
Provider
Conflicts
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/edlabordem/re1072607.html.
57. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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The same can be said of the fourth element of the grand bargain:
reducing the scope of ERISA preemption. I prefer the simple repeal of
section 514.58 Since I doubt that this is in the political cards, I would at
least propose that state laws relative to health care be given the same
legal status as state criminal, banking, securities and insurance laws,
namely, exemption from ERISA's heightened preemption standards.59
But here again my point is not to provide specifics but rather to outline
the possibility of a grand bargain.
Taken as whole, the grand bargain would reduce substantially the
net regulatory burden placed on employers and their ERISA-govemed
retirement and employee benefit plans. It would at the same time assure
that the regulation which persists will productively and meaningfully
protect employees and their families.
Two sets of persons will reject out of hand the possibility of this
grand bargain. Those irrevocably wedded to the paternalistic ideology
of ERISA will object to the first, deregulatifig component of the
package. If more regulation is invariably good, there is no warrant for a
concerted effort to identify and eliminate unproductive burdens on
employee benefit plans. Indeed, for the true believers (and they are
many, articulate and well-intentioned), there is no such thing as
unproductive legislation of employer-sponsored retirement and fringe
benefit arrangements.60
Conversely, those who believe that no regulation is ever productive
will reject the last three elements of the grand bargain, intended to
update ERISA's regulatory scheme for the twenty-first century. This

58. 1 note an important qualification: I am increasingly convinced by those commentators,
including speakers at this Symposium, who argue that municipal regulation of employee benefits
and of health care in particular would impose an unacceptably onerous burden on national
employers. Thomas P. Gies & Jane R. Foster, Leaving Well Enough Alone: Reflections on the
Current State of ERISA Remedial Law, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 449, 462-63 (2009). There
are thousands of municipalities in the United States, many with overlapping jurisdictions. See
Geoffrey K. Tumbull & Salpie S. Djoundourian, Overlapping jurisdictions: Substitutes or
complements?, 75 PUB. CHOICE 231, 232 (1993). If each of these localities could pursue its own
policy vis-d-vis employer-provided fringe benefits, the cumulative compliance burden could impact
interstate employers unacceptably. See id.
In contrast, there are only fifty states.
Permitting the states to experiment and
accommodate different preferences will yield benefits while imposing more modest compliance
costs on national employers. See Larry J. Pittman, A Plain Meaning Interpretation of ERISA's
Preemption and Saving Clauses: In Support of a State Law Preemption of Section 1132(a) of
ERISA 's Civil Enforcement Provisions, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 593, 640-41 (2004).
59. Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 514(b)(2)(A), (b)(4), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), (b)(4) (2006).
60.

See, e.g., Gies & Foster, supra note 58, at 468.
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position also has many intelligent and well-intentioned adherents.61
However, for mushy moderates like myself, a grand bargain along
these lines carries the possibility of reducing significantly the overall net
burden on employers and plans while simultaneously improving
protection for plan participants and their families.
For those willing to entertain that bargain, there remain important
caveats. Most obviously, the grand bargain, like all such compromise
packages, is likely to be fragile and difficult to obtain. Implementing the
grand bargain will require statesmanship and enlightened self-interest,
two phenomena often in short supply. Nevertheless, a grand bargain
along these lines is, I respectfully suggest, a goal worth pursuing.
And so, as I close, I observe many of you leaning over your coffee
cups with the same skeptical look Professor Bittker had three and onehalf decades ago as he and I first learned of ERISA. In the years which
followed, ERISA, as they say, has been very, very good to me. I remain
convinced that, despite all of its flaws and limitations (and these are real
and serious), ERISA can be retooled and rebalanced in a grand bargain
for the challenges which lie before us.

61. See, e.g., Theodore R. Groom & John B. Shoven, Deregulating the Private Pension
System, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM 123, 124, 152 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2005).
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